Disclosure in epidemics

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105469zbMATH Open1492.91174OpenAlexW4224884119WikidataQ113294300 ScholiaQ113294300MaRDI QIDQ2673170FDOQ2673170

Authors: Ju Hu, Zhen Zhou 

Publication date: 9 June 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105469

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zbMATH Keywords

disclosureepidemicscongestioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30) Economics of information (91B44) Potential and congestion games (91A14)

Cites Work

• Testing alone is insufficient
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Optimal test allocation
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Pooled testing for quarantine decisions

Cited In (3)

• Contagion management through information disclosure
• A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
• Information disclosure and vaccination externalities

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