Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
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Publication:608531
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.013zbMath1200.91031OpenAlexW3123581009MaRDI QIDQ608531
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/3424
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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