All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.10.010MaRDI QIDQ1757539zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chang Koo Chi, Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki

Publication date 15 January 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/35362

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionswar of attritioncommon valuesaffiliated signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• All-Pay Contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case

Cited in

(10)

• Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds

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