Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

DOI10.1007/BF01258621MaRDI QIDQ1923978zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Erwin Amann, Wolfgang Leininger

Publication date 13 October 1996

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

linkage principleall-pay sealed-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Ranking asymmetric auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939034 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets

Cited in

(11)

• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm
• Research on pricing rules and expected revenue under all-pay auctions
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• A class of \(N\)-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Basic auction theory revisited
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals

This page was built for publication: Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1923978)