Basic auction theory revisited

DOI10.1111/IJET.12054MaRDI QIDQ4584745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12054

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsnon-quasilinear preferencesrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Second price auctions without expected utility
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

Cited in

(2)

• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5296347 (Why is no real title available?)

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