Basic auction theory revisited

DOI10.1111/IJET.12054zbMATH Open1398.91290OpenAlexW1482498299MaRDI QIDQ4584745FDOQ4584745

Authors: Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12054

Recommendations

• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Second price auctions without expected utility
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsrevenue equivalencenon-quasilinear preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity

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