On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
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Publication:2442845
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.014zbMATH Open1290.91067OpenAlexW2152236218MaRDI QIDQ2442845FDOQ2442845
Authors: Maciej H. Kotowski, Fei Li
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11718166
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Cites Work
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- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
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Cited In (11)
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints
- Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
- Resource inequality in the war of attrition
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