Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3669036 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3292104 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- High bids and broke winners
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
Cited in
(12)- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
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