Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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Publication:1864800
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0896zbMATH Open1031.91035OpenAlexW2136040603MaRDI QIDQ1864800FDOQ1864800
Authors: Hanming Fang, Sérgio O. Parreiras 
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2cb3d523ef3f5a1522d52dbc987f582845417521
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- High bids and broke winners
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
Cited In (12)
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
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