Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0896MaRDI QIDQ1864800zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hanming Fang, Sérgio O. Parreiras

Publication date 23 March 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2cb3d523ef3f5a1522d52dbc987f582845417521

zbMATH Keywords

affiliated valuesfinancially constrained bidderssecond price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Affiliated-value second-price auctions with two financially constrained bidders are studied. The existence of a symmetric equilibrium is proved under general conditions. Comparative statics results are provided.

Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3669036 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3292104 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
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• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
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Cited in

(12)

• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
• Endogenous budget constraints
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values

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