Endogenous budget constraints
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Publication:2409712
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.04.001zbMath1397.91260OpenAlexW2606080618MaRDI QIDQ2409712
Publication date: 13 October 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.001
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