Endogenous budget constraints
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Publication:2409712
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4155875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- High bids and broke winners
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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