Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

DOI10.3982/TE1745MaRDI QIDQ4586069zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Justin Burkett

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1745

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(16)

• Optimal constrained bidding
• Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• A model and procedure for competitive bidding under resource constraints
• Constrained equilibrium in a bidding problem
• Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
• Endogenous budget constraints
• Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks

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