Optimal constrained bidding
Consider a bidder who, subject only to a constraint on his choice of bidding strategy, will choose a strategy that maximizes his expected gross receipts. The bidder's choice of strategy may be constrained by an upper limit on exposure, an upper limit on expected expenditures, or a lower limit on expected profits. We prove that constraining the bidder only by an appropriate upper limit on expected expenditures in effect limits him to expected profit maximizing strategies; in many examples, expected profit maximizing strategies cannot be induced by solely limiting the bidder's exposure.
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- Constrained equilibrium in a bidding problem
- A model and procedure for competitive bidding under resource constraints
- Two rules of a sealed ceiling bid and their analysis by mathematical programming techniques
- Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
- Optimal Real-Time Bidding Strategies
- The bidding selection and assignment problem with minimum quantity commitment
- Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders
- On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding
This page was built for publication: Optimal constrained bidding
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1087118)
