Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders

DOI10.1111/J.1475-3995.2005.00526.XzbMath1133.91373OpenAlexW2028459198MaRDI QIDQ5449872

Mahmut Parlar, Fee Seng Chou

Publication date: 19 March 2008

Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-3995.2005.00526.x

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsrevenue maximizationcertificate of entitlementrandom number of bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic programming (90C15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• The distribution of rational points on varieties defined over a finite field
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