Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2011.05.039zbMATH Open1238.91077OpenAlexW2050848042MaRDI QIDQ420898FDOQ420898

Authors: Ching-Chung Kuo, Zhen Li 

Publication date: 23 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.039

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zbMATH Keywords

nonlinear programmingrevenue maximizationauctions/biddingdiscrete bidDutch auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Nonlinear Programming
• Optimal Auction Design
• The declining price anomaly
• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
• The discrete bid first auction
• Fear of losing in a clock auction
• Optimal price decremental strategy for Dutch auctions
• Predicting bidders' willingness to pay in online multiunit ascending auctions: analytical and empirical insights
• Slow Dutch auctions
• Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION
• Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders

Cited In (9)

• Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
• A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
• Optimal price decremental strategy for Dutch auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions

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