Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

DOI10.1007/S10058-017-0202-ZMaRDI QIDQ2318124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Makoto Shimoji

Publication date 13 August 2019

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z

zbMATH Keywords

discrete private-value auctionsrevenue comparisonweak dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
• Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels

Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• Admissibility in Games
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• On rationalizability and beliefs in discrete private-value first-price auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge

Cited in

(2)

• Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations

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