A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
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(53)- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
- Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
- Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions
- Price-region bids in electricity markets
- Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
- Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
- Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- The set of equilibria of first-price auctions
- On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
- Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
- Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
- Information percolation in segmented markets
- Updating toward the signal
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- Auctions
- Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Trade of a common value good
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- The role of information in auctions
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
- All-pay auctions with different forfeits
- Common-value auctions with discrete private information
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
- Information and strategic behavior
- Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets
- Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets
- The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation
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