Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Communications to the editor: Competitive bidding with disparate information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and imperfect information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
Cited in
(17)- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
- Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders
- A learning approach to auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- Reputational bidding
- Hybrid auctions revisited
- Functional forms in studies of reputation in online auctions
- Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
- On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions
- Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions
- Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
- Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
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