Reputation in repeated second-price auctions (Q1106074)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060950
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| default for all languages | No label defined |
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| English | Reputation in repeated second-price auctions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060950 |
Statements
Reputation in repeated second-price auctions (English)
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1988
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A model in which two bidders take part in a series of second-price, common-value auctions is examined. The question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer's standpoint, in a repeated auction setting, is partially addressed. It is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions, when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively. Second-price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder, and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer.
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repeated game of incomplete information
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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symmetric stage game
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asymmetric stage game
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two bidders
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second-price, common-value auctions
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optimal auction
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repeated auction setting
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0.8171201944351196
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0.8093993663787842
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0.8080319762229919
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0.8062301278114319
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0.8022798895835876
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