Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.02.007zbMATH Open1200.91122OpenAlexW1968246376MaRDI QIDQ608552FDOQ608552

Authors: Yuk-fai Fong, Daniel F. Garrett 

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15419/1/bidding.pdf

Recommendations

• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Successful uninformed bidding
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information

zbMATH Keywords

model uncertaintysecond-price auctioncommon value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Naive bidding
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty

Cited In (19)

• Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
• Successful uninformed bidding
• Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
• Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
• The private value single item bisection auction
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• One man, one bid

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