The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
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Publication:960280
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.01.001zbMATH Open1151.91463OpenAlexW2088308698MaRDI QIDQ960280FDOQ960280
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.001
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- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
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- An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
Cited In (13)
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Successful uninformed bidding
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
- Information acquisition in conflicts
- Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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