The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.01.001MaRDI QIDQ960280zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jinwoo Kim

Publication date 16 December 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

common valuefirst-price auctioninformed bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner

Cites work

• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(17)

• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Successful uninformed bidding
• Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
• An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
• Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
• An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• The value of information for auctioneers
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Information concentration in common value environments
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

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