Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.03.009MaRDI QIDQ645642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gorkem Celik, Michael Peters

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcartel agreementsdefault game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Resilient allocation rules for bilateral trade
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

Cited in

(7)

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Consulting collusive experts
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Interim third-party selection in bargaining
• Mechanism design with informational punishment
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

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