On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00033-4zbMath1057.91025MaRDI QIDQ1399561

Sérgio O. Parreiras, Hanming Fang

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00033-4

zbMATH Keywords

auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information, Endogenous budget constraints in auctions, The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions, Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets, Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions, Endogenous budget constraints, Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents, Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences, On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

Cites Work

• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
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