Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0491-8MaRDI QIDQ992056zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Quint

Publication date 8 September 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0491-8

zbMATH Keywords

common valuesendogenous informationfirst price auctionssignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information

Cites work

• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Information revelation in auctions
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• The insider's curse
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(10)

• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
• Updating toward the signal
• Costly Signalling in Auctions
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

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