Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0491-8zbMath1195.91061OpenAlexW2142656498MaRDI QIDQ992056

Daniel Quint

Publication date: 8 September 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0491-8

zbMATH Keywords

signalingcommon valuesfirst price auctionsendogenous information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Updating toward the signal ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

Cites Work

• The insider's curse
• Information revelation in auctions
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Information Acquisition in Auctions

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