Private information revelation in common-value auctions

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00012-7zbMath1031.91039OpenAlexW3124003903MaRDI QIDQ1812177

Vlad Mares, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 18 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00012-7

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsInformation revelationLinkage principlePublic Information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Optimal auctions and information disclosure ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Introduction to a Festschrift for Karl Shell

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• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
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