Information concentration in common value environments
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Publication:370959
DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0143-0zbMath1273.91219MaRDI QIDQ370959
Publication date: 20 September 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2012-23.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
Cites Work
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- Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design