Information concentration in common value environments

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0143-0zbMath1273.91219OpenAlexW2164039427MaRDI QIDQ370959

Mikhael Shor, Vlad Mares

Publication date: 20 September 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2012-23.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common value auctionsmechanism designindustry concentrationinformation concentration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

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