Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0059-2MaRDI QIDQ1022381zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date 22 June 2009

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79765/

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Cited in

(17)

• Existence of equilibrium in a discriminatory price auction
• On the existence of ideal Nash equilibria in discontinuous games with infinite criteria
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
• On the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Information concentration in common value environments
• Two examples of equilibrium nonexistence
• On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
• Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
• Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
• Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
• Information requirements for mechanism design
• On the existence of equilibria in games with arbitrary strategy spaces and preferences

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