Information concentration in common value environments

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0143-0MaRDI QIDQ370959zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vlad Mares, Mikhael Shor

Publication date 20 September 2013

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2012-23.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommon value auctionsindustry concentrationinformation concentration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3373547 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3417266 (Why is no real title available?)
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Cited in

(1)

• Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction

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