Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.03.019MaRDI QIDQ397961zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yan Long

Publication date 12 August 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.019

zbMATH Keywords

worst case analysiscommon valueaverage value functionseller revenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207373 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Competitive auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Worst-case equilibria
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

Cited in

(2)

• Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction

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