Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
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Publication:397961
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207373 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Competitive auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Worst-case equilibria
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
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