Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

DOI10.3982/ECTA16297zbMATH Open1475.91109OpenAlexW3158791481MaRDI QIDQ5860141FDOQ5860141

Songzi Du, Benjamin Brooks

Publication date: 18 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16297

zbMATH Keywords

maxminmechanism designprofit maximizationcommon valueinformation structureoptimal auctionsinformation designBayes correlated equilibriumdirect mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cited In (7)

• Robust incentives for risk
• Information design in optimal auctions
• Correlation-robust auction design
• Mechanism design with model specification
• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
• Robust contracting in general contract spaces

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