Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
DOI10.3982/ECTA16297zbMATH Open1475.91109OpenAlexW3158791481MaRDI QIDQ5860141FDOQ5860141
Authors: Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du 
Publication date: 18 November 2021
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16297
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maxminmechanism designprofit maximizationcommon valueinformation structureoptimal auctionsinformation designBayes correlated equilibriumdirect mechanism
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cited In (10)
- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
- Robust incentives for risk
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Correlation-robust auction design
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces
- Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
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