Common-value auctions with discrete private information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302008 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
- Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
Cited in
(25)- Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
- Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- A note on discrete bid first-price auction with general value distribution
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
- Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions
- Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- Auctions with a random number of identical bidders
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