Common-value auctions with discrete private information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90133-OzbMath0732.90023OpenAlexW2056810902MaRDI QIDQ809865

Ruqu Wang

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90133-o

zbMATH Keywords

auction gamefinite-valued, conditionally independent private informationfirst-price, sealed-bid, common-value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions, Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case, Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting, Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information, Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information, Multidimensional private value auctions

Cites Work

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• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction