Common-value auctions with discrete private information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90133-OzbMATH Open0732.90023OpenAlexW2056810902MaRDI QIDQ809865FDOQ809865

Authors: Ruqu Wang 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90133-o

Recommendations

• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
• An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information

zbMATH Keywords

auction gamefinite-valued, conditionally independent private informationfirst-price, sealed-bid, common-value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (25)

• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions
• Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
• Auctions with a random number of identical bidders
• A note on discrete bid first-price auction with general value distribution
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
• Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
• Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals

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