Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0282-XzbMATH Open1274.91232OpenAlexW2038984260MaRDI QIDQ422349FDOQ422349
Publication date: 16 May 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0282-x
Recommendations
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
- Optimal Auction Design
- The Fibonacci Numbers: Exposed
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Common-value auctions with discrete private information
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- First price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Bayesian Implementation
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
Cited In (12)
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
- Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
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