The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

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Publication:1162442

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90008-8zbMath0481.90052OpenAlexW2032955583WikidataQ56481603 ScholiaQ56481603MaRDI QIDQ1162442

Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/462.pdf




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