Multi-player contests with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0472-yzbMath1262.91090OpenAlexW2049119027MaRDI QIDQ690678

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 28 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationall-pay auctionscontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests ⋮ A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests ⋮ Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting ⋮ Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information ⋮ Common-value contests with asymmetric information ⋮ Probabilistic procurement auctions ⋮ Accuracy in contests: players' perspective ⋮ An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Information in conflicts.
• Contest success functions
• Population uncertainty in contests
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

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