Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.03.003MaRDI QIDQ1668227zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Matros, Alex Possajennikov

Publication date 3 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/78715/1/FinalAccepted_EconLett_Mar16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscommon valuecontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Information in Tullock contests
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples

Cited in

(3)

• Dual sourcing with price discovery
• Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
• Unbeatable strategies

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