Information in Tullock contests
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Publication:2424308
DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9682-8zbMath1411.91250OpenAlexW2782297221MaRDI QIDQ2424308
Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela
Publication date: 24 June 2019
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1710.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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