Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.036MaRDI QIDQ429138zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David McAdams

Publication date 26 June 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036

zbMATH Keywords

entryinformation acquisitionsecond-price auctionignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions
• No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices
• Second price auctions without expected utility
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

Cites work

• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(1)

• Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions

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