Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.010zbMath1530.91213OpenAlexW4389166520MaRDI QIDQ6188677

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Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctioncontestinformation disclosureinterdependent valuationsBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Information in conflicts.
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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