Information revelation in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.004zbMATH Open1153.91434OpenAlexW3122634683MaRDI QIDQ863274FDOQ863274

Authors: Jean-Pierre Benoît, Juan Dubra 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.004

Recommendations

• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
• The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinformation revelationunraveling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• A correction to uniqueness in ``Competitive bidding and proprietary information

Cited In (14)

• An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
• Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts
• Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
• The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• The insider's curse
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions

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