The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034zbMath1302.91108OpenAlexW2008070150MaRDI QIDQ485721

Fei Li, Maciej H. Kotowski

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscontestswar of attritioninformation disclosurebudget constraintslinkage principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Resource inequality in the war of attrition

Cites Work

• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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