Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
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Publication:926222
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0zbMath1159.91012OpenAlexW1552203786MaRDI QIDQ926222
Luciano I. de Castro, Humberto Moreira, Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0
auctionall-pay auctiontie-breaking rulediscontinuous gamepure strategy equilibriumnon-monotonic bidding function
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (9)
Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis ⋮ Equilibrium existence and approximation of regular discontinuous games ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux ⋮ Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games ⋮ Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values ⋮ On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games ⋮ Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
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