Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.029zbMath1238.91073OpenAlexW2109533909MaRDI QIDQ420894

Arieh Gavious, Ramy Elitzur

Publication date: 23 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.029

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsasymptotic methodscontestsventure capitalentrepreneurs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

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• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Allocation of attention within venture capital firms
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Contest architecture
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective

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