Large auctions with risk-averse bidders

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6zbMath1211.91134MaRDI QIDQ532743

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic analysis; risk aversion; equilibrium strategy; revenue equivalence; large auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions, Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach, Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis, Revenue in contests with many participants, Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders

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