The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer's bid double auction
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Publication:6541995
DOI10.1007/S10058-023-00338-6zbMATH Open1537.9112MaRDI QIDQ6541995FDOQ6541995
Authors: Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
Publication date: 21 May 2024
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
central limit theoremrational expectations equilibriumcommon valuedouble auctioninterdependent value
Cites Work
- Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
- Finite mixture models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
- Strategic supply function competition with private information
- Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Distribution of quantiles in samples from a bivariate population
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- Price discovery using a double auction
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