The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00404.XMaRDI QIDQ3421392zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew O. Jackson, Ilan Kremer

Publication date 12 February 2007

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00404.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
• Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
• Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
• Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders

Cited in

(11)

• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
• Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
• Renewable auctions: bidding for real options
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
• Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price
• On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

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