Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.06.002zbMath1137.91408MaRDI QIDQ2427126

Ilia Tsetlin, Ronald M. Harstad, Aleksandar Saša Pekeč

Publication date: 8 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2613

zbMATH Keywords

common-value auctions; information aggregation; uncertain level of competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Auctions with an Invitation Cost, A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation, Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions