Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00346zbMath1141.91398OpenAlexW1981134135MaRDI QIDQ5475005

Ilan Kremer

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00346

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure ⋮ Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders

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