Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00346zbMATH Open1141.91398OpenAlexW1981134135MaRDI QIDQ5475005FDOQ5475005

Authors: Ilan Kremer 

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00346

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (14)

• Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets
• Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
• Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
• Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
• The insider's curse
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
• On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
• Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions
• Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information

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