Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00224-2zbMath1087.91018MaRDI QIDQ1877164

Han Hong, Matthew Shum

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

convergence rates; information aggregation; large auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Large auctions with risk-averse bidders, Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders, Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology

Cites Work

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• Note on the Consistency of the Maximum Likelihood Estimate