Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
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Publication:2347769
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Cites work
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
- Extreme value theory. An introduction.
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
Cited in
(8)- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence
- Asymptotic and small sample analysis of the stochastic properties and certainty equivalents of winning bids in independent private values auctions
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
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