Auctions with resale and risk aversion
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Publication:2157289
DOI10.1007/S40505-022-00221-7zbMATH Open1497.91139OpenAlexW4225157660MaRDI QIDQ2157289FDOQ2157289
Authors: Sanyyam Khurana 
Publication date: 27 July 2022
Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00221-7
Recommendations
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Auctions with resale and bargaining power
- Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
- Auction design with a risk averse seller
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
Cites Work
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Auctions with resale and bargaining power
Cited In (17)
- Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
- How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
- Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
- Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence
- Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study
- Auctions with resale at a later date
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
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