Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.004zbMath1195.91055MaRDI QIDQ1039728

Isa E. Hafalir, Vijay Krishna

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; resale; asymmetries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale, Auctions with synergy and resale, Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case, Auctions with resale and bargaining power, Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study, First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders, Auctions with entry and resale

Cites Work

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• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
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• First price auctions with resale
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs