Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.007MaRDI QIDQ2078069zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors René Kirkegaard

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyasymmetric auctionsreserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
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Cites work

• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Optimal Auction Design
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

Cited in

(3)

• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
• Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

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