Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects
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Publication:1728365
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.09.010zbMath1409.91116OpenAlexW2761309808MaRDI QIDQ1728365
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.09.010
Cites Work
- Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
- Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- First price auctions with resale
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
- Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
- Optimal Auction Design
- Collusion via Resale
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
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